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The Holland-class Patrol Vessels of the Royal Netherlands Navy has been designed to conduct world-wide operations with a 
low level of violence.  Minimization of the exploitation costs has been translated in a frigate size vessel design to be manned by 
a crew of 50.   In particular, the support of Battle Damage Repair required serious development as today’s solutions are based 
upon having a much larger crew. Adoption of modern fire-fighting techniques such as ship-wide deployment of automated 
water-mist systems and extensive use of center-fed hose reels appeared to be essential steps to cope with lower manning levels. 
However, that is not enough as there are other internal battle aspects that (today) require significant manpower such as 
information gathering to obtain the desired situational awareness of the current state of the damage, and complex engineering 
tasks to mitigate the damages and the management of the necessary resources.  For this reason, this paper discusses the 
approach and development of four (4) platform management system Damage Surveillance and Control (DSAC) applications 
as an example how future internal battles can be supported to achieve a higher quality (less human errors) of battle damage 
control, by means of a better situational awareness and a significant reduction of the workload during Battle Damage Repair.
Los buques patrulleros holandeses de la marina de los Países Bajos han sido diseñados para conducir operaciones a nivel mundial 
con un bajo nivel de violencia.  Minimización de la explotación de los costos ha sido llevada al tamaño de las fragatas, las cuales 
son diseñadas para llevar una tripulación de 50 personas. En particular, el apoyo a la reparación de daños en batalla requiere un 
importante desarrollo dado que las soluciones actuales son con base en mantener un mayor número de tripulación. La adopción 
de técnicas contraincendios modernas tales como la implementación en la toda la embarcación de sistemas de agua nebulizada 
de manera automática y el uso extensivo de carretes de mangueras centro-alimentadas, parecen ser pasos esenciales para enfrentar 
bajos niveles de dotación. Sin embargo, esto no es suficiente mientras que se encuentren  otros aspectos internos de batalla un 
significante esfuerzo de recurso humano, entre los que se destaca la consolidación de la información para obtener la situación 
actual de los daños ocurridos, así como las complejas tareas de ingeniería para mitigar los daños y la gestión de los recursos.  Por 
esta razón, éste estudio discute el alcance,  desarrollo y aplicaciones de cuatro (04) sistemas de gestión de la plataforma para 
vigilancia y control de daños (DSAC), tomando como ejemplo como futuras batallas pueden ser apoyadas para alcanzar una 
mayor calidad (disminución de errores humanos) de control de daños, por medio de un mejor conocimiento de la situación y 
una reducción significativa de la carga laboral durante la reparación de daños en batalla.
Key words: Battle Damage Repair, Damage Surveillance & Control (DSAC), Fire Fighting & Damage Control 
(FFDC).
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Integrated Platform Management Systems
Contemporary Integrated Platform Management 
Systems (IPMS) provide the promise of reduced 
manning and increased operational capabilities. 
However, in the design of modern Human 
Machine or Graphical User Interface (HMI, GUI) 
human factors are frequently underrepresented.
Common HMI is based on a representation 
of the platform installations with simplified 
process and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) 
and corresponding alarm & event handling 
(Alarm Table). These so called 'mimics' only 
contains a limited 'functional' representation 
of the arrangement of components in a specific 
platform system. Within a mimic, components are 
represented by a symbol, with dynamic fields for 
values and control items. Interaction with other 
systems normally is limited to conditional relations 
(inhibits) which are programmed in the core of the 
software.
To be able to safeguard the ship, the operator has to 
have a profound overview, or situational awareness 
of the complete system and interaction with other 
platform components and systems (propagation 
of failures). Although the amount of I/O steadily 
increases, not all devices of each system are 
equipped with sensors and actuators and available 
I/O data usually is not correlated to provide 
with a comprehensive situational overview of the 
platform systems. For operators of IPMS systems, 
this means that a lot of knowledge and experience 
is necessary to operate the entire platform from 
the IPMS, which results in high cognitive loads, 
especially in case of failure or damage.
Another universal trend is that the system 
complexity of equipment is growing continuously 
and a growing number of platform installations 
are equipped with own 'automation' or CPU's with 
many I/O and Build In Test (BIT). Frequently, 
this diagnostic data is directly distributed through 
the network which causes overflow for operators 
and hardware. A high automation and integration 
level is required to support reduced manning and 
maximize the diagnostic support functions of the 
IPMS.
As IPMS systems become increasingly complex, 
negligence of human factors will automatically 
lead to systems that are more difficult to use, more 
problematic for training and less effective. 
In addition, knowledge of the system will decrease 
rapidly and the operators will adapt with regard to 
the system deficiency with 'workarounds'.
Future IPMS require Human Machine Interfaces 
(HMI) for IPMS must assist the users optimally, 
with information at the right time at the right 
place required to operate, manage and maintain 
the technical installations, and in different States 
of Readiness. In such a task oriented IPMS, 
processing and visualization information needs 
to be adapted to tasks, roles and events, i.e. the 
information shall be matched to given functions or 
personnel levels (manager, operator, maintainer) of 
the platform system.
The level of integration and automation of 
individual components has a direct influence on 
the allocation of (maintenance) functions or tasks 
that can be performed by humans, hardware or 
software. According to RNLN, the diagnostic 
support function of the (integral) Platform 
Management System can be divided into three 
basic elements, namely:
•	 'State Function', or availability of hardware 
and software components of the system or 
functional chain;
•	 'Effect Function' which relates to disturbances 
of capabilities in the functional chain;
•	 'Cause Function’ for fault location and 
maintenance support.
This model is now being applied throughout all of 
RNLN new building and modernization projects 
and as a result, a more structured approach 
towards Human Factors and allocation of tasks 
to automated systems to reduce the workload and, 
subsequently, the size of the crew.
This is reflected in the approach of the (development 
of) automation systems for the Holland-class patrol 
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vessels, particularly the Damage Surveillance and 
Control systems.
Holland Class PV Concept
In the operational concept of the newly build 
Patrol Vessels for the Royal Netherlands Navy 
(RNLN), the objective was to realize an unmanned 
Ship’s Control centre. In the “Progamma van 
eisen voor het realiseren van een onbemande 
Technische Central”, RNLN focused on the 
functions and tasks of the Automation System 
and appointing those to designated personnel, 
including authorizations, inhibits and individual 
man machine interfaces, such as workstations, 
mobile devices and communication equipment. 
This resulted in an advanced IPMS system with 
Flexible Function Allocation, which supports the 
crew in the operation (control and monitoring) of 
the platform systems.
Apart from the reduction of the workload during 
normal operation of the vessel, much emphasis 
was laid on the Damage Control Tasks, as 
historically these have a significant influence on 
the size of the complement not only for the marine 
engineering department, but also for the weapons 
and operational departments. Therefore, the main 
potential and resulting measures to reduce the 
(engineering) crew were considered two-fold, first 
to have an unmanned ship’s control center and 
secondly to have a combined Command Bridge 
to direct all operations, including Battle Damage 
Repair. In addition, several automated fire-fighting 
systems were installed including a high pressure 
water mist system for machinery spaces and 
cabins. To determine how Battle Damage Repair 
management can be improved and supported using 
automation, and reduce the total complement, a 
workload analysis including task allocation was 
performed.
Platform management processes particularly focus 
on operational capabilities while maintaining the 
safety of systems and crew. Even under normal 
operational circumstances this is a challenge for the 
complement of the ‘Holland’ Class Patrol vessels, 
but becomes paramount in the event of damage. 
In this case, the primary goal of the management is 
to create an overall Situation Awareness for correct 
decision making. This requires a very complex and 
layered organization and information model that 
is able to identify, assess and respond to a great 
variety of events that can occur. For the technical 
departments, platform management is directed 
towards the availability of operational capabilities, 
decomposed to the correct functioning of operators, 
maintainers, installations and components. 
As a result, the technical departments’ main 
objective is to provide with diagnostic information, 
i.e. Situational Awareness as well as operation 
and maintenance of the subordinate systems and 
installations. This requires in-depth knowledge of 
the platform systems and their interrelationships 
and implies that for all levels within the 
organization the goals (Command Aim) are 
known and projected on solving complex system 
problems.
Human Centered Approach
According to Rasmussen (5) information 
processing and decision making on board ships can 
be assigned based on three different levels (shown 
in the model below):
•	 Skill-based (or natural) behavior: 
predetermined signals are physically and 
automatically interrelated directly with one 
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•	 Rule-based (or procedural) behavior: situations 
are interpreted according to general rules for a 
certain situation.
•	 Knowledge-based behavior: if there are no rules 
present, in e.g. a new situation, one will assess 
the situation by calling experiences and by 
building correlations between information 
triggers.
In the development of IPMS systems, like 
Imtech, most manufacturers only apply technical 
frameworks to make sure that the technical 
requirements will be met. As a result, human-
related requirements are not involved at all. Absence 
of knowledge on intended operational processes on 
board is the main cause why the actual users are 
not happy with the delivered system, complaining 
that their tasks are not supported by the actual 
system.
For the development of the Battle Damage Repair 
support functions, a more Human Centered 
Approach was chosen to specify requirements and 
develop solutions for the DSAC support applications. 
Th e chosen approach actually fi ts the standard DIN 
EN ISO 13407 standard on human-centered design 
processes for interactive systems. Th e method calls 
can be summarized with the following model, and 
implies the following realization:
•	 Investigative  research on intended workfl ow 
or work Description (tasks, decisions etc)
•	 Visualize the intended context of users 
and systems (objects, people, locations, 
communication and relations with other 
objects etc)
•	 Discussions with the intended users to 
document equirements and expectations.
•	 Evaluate interim ideas and concepts of the 
to be delivered system by any means of 
prototyping (e.g. screen shots, diagrams, 
material prototypes etc) and adapt the solution 
according to the results of these evaluations
•	 Evaluate the delivered system once it has been 
in operation for a number of months.
In  2010,  the  Royal  Netherlands  Navy  and  Imtech 
Marine  &  Off shore  formed  a  Fire  Fighting  and 
Damage Control (FFDC) workgroup  to  address 
this  problem and aforementioned approach to 
develop the necessary applications to support 
Battle Damage Repair.
For the initial contract, a number of requirements 
were formulated and agreed upon, resulting in a 
scope of work decomposed in multiple phases, 
Fig. 3. 
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including prototyping of the generated solutions 
against the ‘improved’ workflows or procedures. 
Evidently, the Royal Netherlands Navy concentrated 
on general starting points and (changing) tasks and 
procedures not only for the Holland Class Patrol 
Vessels but towards BDR in general while Imtech 
concentrated on the requirements and design of 
the necessary tooling and Platform Management 
Systems (IPMS) applications. 
Situational Awareness and Performance 
Shaping Factors
The Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) as 
occurring in a BDR situation may lead to critical 
situations caused by human failures. One of the 
most important PSF is Situational Awareness.
Situational Awareness can be defined as the human 
percipience of the condition of an environment 
within an operational process. Situational 
Awareness has three (3) levels:
1. Perception, the cognition of the situation;
2. Comprehension, interpretation of the 
recognized situation;
3. Projection, estimation of the consequences of 
the situation.
Ideally, decisions are taken based on these three 
pillars, resulting in a changed environment 
in which new situational awareness is being 
established. Evidently, this process is iterative and 
will take place for every situation/incident within 
the Battle Damage Repair process, which is shown 
in the following picture. The quality of the model 
depends on other PSF, such as availability and 
presentation of information, communication but 
also experience of the individual.
Another way of decision making is called 
‘automaticy’, or an automated (conditioned) 
response. Although a certain level of experience 
or routine can increase the quality of decision 
making, automaticity is not the desired response 
on situational awareness and might result in 
human error.
Elimination of the occurrence of this effect can be 
realized by optimizing the Man Machine Interface, 
which was tested during the prototyping sessions 
and during the evaluation after delivery.
Workflow analysis approach 
For gaining the actual deeper insights on the 
operational workflow of our IPMS-users, a 
workflow analysis was conducted according to the 
so-called GIVS-method. How this GIVS method 
works will be explained later in this paragraph. 
The research questions for this type of research 
were as follows:
Enviroment EnviromentPerception
Automaticity
novice expert
Information processing
mechanisms
Long term
memory storage
Projection
Feedback
Decision Performanceof Actions
Compre-
hension
SITUATION AWARENESS
Possible cognitive processes
Fig. 4. Situational Awareness Model.
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•	 Which specific tasks can be distinguished 
per employee during a battle damage repair 
process? 
•	 What specific information is needed to carry 
out each of these specific tasks?
•	 How do they gain this information? By 
consulting colleagues/ looking up the IPMS, 
using artefacts/relying on their own experience?
•	 When does decision making occur? What kind 
of information is used to make the decision 
and what are the consequences?
•	 In what parts of their workflow do they have to 
compose/update/revert to situation awareness 
(external/internal battle) in mental models? 
What kinds of information do they use to do so?
•	 What problems do occur during a procedure? 
When do they occur and what are possible 
causes and/or consequences?
To gain insights in the deeper layers of their 
workflow the the GIVS-method is applied, or 
better known as Generative Interview Visually 
Supported. GIVS is a common interview tool, 
to reveal the aspects as named in the research 
questions. By doing so, each of their personal 
tactics can be revealed in a one on one interview-
like session.
Internal Battle / Battle Damage Repair
In order to understand the task analysis first the 
state 1 Battle Damage Repair (BDR) organization 
of a typical frigate that was analyzed is presented 
in below Fig. 5.
The BDR Organization picture illustrates the 
extent of manpower and information flow involved 
in  managing the ‘Internal Battle’; the collective 
term for all activities to recover the maximum 
possible  war fighting capability that supports 
the command aim after having suffered serious 
damage. 
The purpose of the detailed task analysis described 
in this paper is to identify the tasks performed by 
the management team in the BDR organization 
that can be automated.
The Damage Control (DC) officer is in charge 
of this process. He directs the section base 
officers who manage the fire-fighting teams in 
their section, each covering half the ship. In the 
traditional situation the DC-officer and the section 
base officers share a number of tasks.
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Well trained section base officers will perform 
most of these tasks autonomously but they have to 
check their actions with the DC-officer and make 
sure the information is provided to him. For this 
reason the tasks the DC-officer and section base 
officers perform are presented in one column in 
the task analysis. Incident board operators support 
the DC-officer and section base officers. They keep 
the incident board up to date and communicate 
information to all other incident board operators, 
6 in total. In the traditional situation two IPMS 
operators support the DC-officer, one operating 
systems and one executing electrical isolation 
under supervision of the Electrical (E) officer 
(DCO-L). However, they also perform tasks for 
the Mechanical (M) and Weapons-officer. The 
tasks the operators perform are presented in one 
column of the task analysis.
The purpose of a task analysis in this context is to 
identify the main drivers of the BDR organization. 
The scope is limited to the Platform Management 
System and thus the Damage Control and Marine 
Engineering Repair organization. It does not take 
into account the Combat Management System; 
the analysis excludes the Weapon Engineering 
repair organization. Of course, further integration 
of both  organizations  and  corresponding 
management systems would be a significant 
improvement and will be a challenging subject for 
a future (integration) paper.
A  rough  Subject  Matter  Expert  assessment 
describes  the  percentage  of  time  BDR 
management spends on generic tasks. These tasks 
are subdivided in: 
1. Gathering information (through 
communication and plotting),  
2. Assessing information (to obtain situational 
awareness),  
3. Decision making, and 
4. Acting.
As illustrated in the above Fig. 6, these actions are 
performed in a continuous cycle, in accordance 
with the Situational Awareness Model of the 
previous chapter. 
The task analysis was performed by a working 
group of Royal Netherland Naval officers, which 
all performed the role of DC-officer in their career, 
supported by an automation expert. The authors 
were part of this working group. The results of the 
task analysis are presented below. 
Author’s comment:
To incorporate Human Factors in the design of a 
new system it is necessary to identify, analyze and 
describe all functions that the system will perform, 
to be able to allocate functions or tasks to a person 
or technology. In the case of a ship’s platform 
systems, this often exceeds the boundaries of the 
automation that is installed to actually control and 
monitor the installations. For an interdisciplinary 
or integral Platform Management approach, it 
is necessary to understand function allocation 
strategies.
A good example of flexible allocation is the auto-
pilot in an aircraft or on a vessel, where highly 
trained and experienced operators can decide 
allocation of (sub)tasks to a highly complex control 
system. 
Also, Operational Readiness functions have 
to be maintained and managed with Platform 
Patrol Vessel Battle Damage 
Repair Task Analysis
Fig. 6. BDR Activity Cycle
GATHERING
INFORMATION
ASSESSING
INFORMATIONACTING
DECISION
MAKING
Development of Fire Fighting & Damage Control automation that enables future crew reduction
Ship Science & Technology - Vol. 8 - n.° 17 - (69-85)  July 2015 - Cartagena (Colombia)
76
Management Processes or Operating Procedures. 
By nature, these procedures / protocols are 
interdisciplinary and require a multi-level 
organization to manage, operate and maintain both 
Platform and Weapon systems. In order to achieve 
this, Operational Readiness Functions (Operation 
& Maintenance) have to be projected/mapped on 
actual Platform/Weapon interdependencies on 
an installation/component level, i.e. Functional 
Chains.
At this moment, these functions are neither 
integrated nor allocated in a (superordinate) 
automation system and therefore these complex 
tasks are left to the operators. In particular during 
live or exercise environment or scenarios this results 
in high cognitive and communicative loads.
Furthermore, the nature of these interdisciplinary 
tasks and functions like Battle Damage Control 
and Sewaco Support unavoidably leads to high 
cognitive and communicative loads.
Task Analysis of Battle Damage Repair
The  task  analysis results show  that  the  fire-
fighting  management  process  includes numerous 
task  performed  by  the  DC-officer  and  section 
base  officers,  most  taking  place  within  the 
first  5 minutes  after  fire  detection. Many of the 
tasks and corresponding actions directly affect the 
situational awareness, and are, by nature, iterative 
resulting in high communicative workload. Correct 
functioning of the BDR organization is further 
complicated as a result of the different locations in 
the ship and verbal communication doctrines.
The introduction of FFDC IEIB on the OPV 
provides a shared information space and reduces 
the required communication. This can potentially 
reduce the amount of plotters.
However the mere quantity of tasks the section 
base officer and DC-officer need to perform in 
the first 5 minutes after an incident remains large. 
Therefore, it was also investigated what tasks of 
the fire-fighting organization can be automated in 
order to support manning reduction.
In order to understand the results of the task 
analysis first the generic tasks and how these are 
performed are described. Subsequently an estimate 
is given of the time spent on these tasks by the 
BDR team.
Gathering information, narrative
The information on the extent of damage after a 
hit of the ship by external projectiles is gathered by 
executing a physical  ‘blanket  search’  by  the crew 
of the ship  while in parallel the IPMS  generates 
alarms that indicate potential problems. 
With the ‘blanket search’, every single 
compartment is physically checked by teams of 
two crew members that subsequently vocally 
report the damage through the BDR  organization 
following  the  communication  lines illustrated in 
the BDR Organization. This means information 
on the damage is communicated to the SCC and 
ultimately the NBCD Officer over 3 to 5 levels. 
Damage related to leakages and fires is first 
gathered in the section base by the Section Base 
Officer (SBO) and plotted on the incident board 
by the section base plotter there. Subsequently, this 
information is verbally communicated to all other 
stations, including the SCC, through the plotter 
over a DC communication line. At these stations 
this information is plotted again on the incident 
board. Therefore, the quality of the information on 
the incident board strongly depends on the quality 
of communication that takes place under stress. It 
is clear that the information on the incident boards 
often is out of date, incomplete and inaccurate, 
even if the information is available at the section 
base. It’s also evident that this communication 
and plotting process is very manpower intensive. 
Fortunately the information on the SCC incident 
board is available for the whole SCC team. 
Damage related to mechanical and electrical 
systems is communicated to the Mechanical and 
Electrical Officer respectively. These officers gather 
this information on their personal state board 
and subsequently report their top priorities to the 
NBCD Officer and other team members that need 
to know.  Again, the gathering of information 
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is manpower intensive. The information on the 
incident boards is often inconsistent, of a low 
quality and not available for the whole SCC team. 
Plotters and messengers spend 100% of their 
time on gathering and presenting information, 
the managers in the SCC an estimated 50% of 
their time, the SBO’s around 40% or their time 
as they have their individual plotters and a single 
hierarchical structure and the operators in the SCC 
around 20% of their time as their primary task is 
operating the ships systems through the IPMS. 
The numbers are presented in the table below.
Assessing information 
All  the  managers  in  the  SCC  and  in  the  section 
base  need  to  assess  the  incoming  information  to 
obtain situational  awareness. Although not always 
consistent and often inaccurate  the DC incident 
boards provide a good means to obtain situational 
awareness on DC incidents for all managers in 
the SCC. The availability of technical systems, 
although often indirectly available in the Platform 
Management System.´ (IPMS) is not presented in 
any  way to the  management,  other than scrolling 
through the enormous amount of MIMIC 
presentations in the IPMS. Therefore every team 
member acts on the information he or she has 
available for him- or herself on the personal state 
board. It needs no explanation that the situational 
awareness of the team is not consistent and often 
inaccurate. In order to overcome this operators and 
managers maintain handwritten lists  of  system 
availability  that  are  stuck  to  the  SCC  wall  to 
release  information  for  the  whole  team.
 
The managers in the BDR organization on average 
spend 30% of their time on assessing information, 
as presented in below Table 1.
Decision Making 
Because  information  is  not  presented  in  a 
structured  way  and  because  information  has  to 
be  gathered  from multiple  sources  that  do not 
communicate related information simultaneously, 
only  very limited time is available for decision 
making. What makes it even more challenging is 
that often decisions are requested from the lower 
hierarchical levels but the information required to 
take the right decisions is not readily available. This 
has two effects: The quality of the decisions is not 
optimal and the time spent on decision making is 
very limited: estimated between 10 and 30% of the 
Table 1. BDR Task Analysis.
Gather information 
(comm's and plot)
Assess information: 
situacional awareness
Decision 
making
Acting: repetitive 
operator sequence
NBCD Officer 50% 30% 20%
Damage control officer 50% 30% 20%
Survivality operator 20% 10% 70%
Plotter DCO 100%
Plotter SBO FWD 100%
Plotter SBO AFT 100%
SBO FWD 40% 30% 30%
SBO AFT 40% 30% 30%
Messenger FWD 100%
Messenger AFT 100%
Mechanical Officer 50% 30% 20%
Mobility Operator 20% 10% 70%
Electrical Officer 50% 330% 20%
Electrical Operator 20% 10% 70%
TOTALS 14 840% 180% 170% 210%
Overall percentage 70% 13% 12% 15%
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available time. Again these numbers are presented 
in the table.
 
Acting 
Acting comprises: 
1. Execution of operator sequences determined in 
the analysis and  
2. Deployment of Battle Damage Repair teams 
(to fight fires, stop leakages and repair systems). 
The execution of operator sequences under stress 
often causes errors and takes the focus away 
from sufficient communication and maintaining 
situational awareness. Therefore SCC officers are 
all supported by an operator. The execution of 
repetitive operator sequences requires significant 
manpower and the high workload of the operator 
causes operator errors. The operators are executing 
operator sequences (that can be automated) 70% 
of their time spending their remaining time on 
communicating their actions to the SCC officers.
 
The deployment of Battle Damage Repair teams 
takes the reverse route of the information on the 
incidents. Due to the overload of communication 
lines often the deployment of these teams is delayed 
as officers are awaiting confirmation  of  their 
priorities  and  thus  where  to  send  the  limited 
amount  of  resources.  The time spent on ordering 
the  deployment  of  Battle  Damage  Repair  teams 
is  included  in  the  tasks  decision  making  and 
communication (gathering of information taking 
place in both directions).
Conclusions of task analysis 
To build up the desired awareness of the overall 
damage situation the management of the Damage 
Control Organization spends approximately 50% 
of her time on communication. Communication 
between the scene of an incident and the Ships 
Control Centre may take place over as many 
as 5 levels. This is time consuming and still can 
result in an incomplete picture. The Damage 
Control Organization requires a system that 
achieves significant reductions in the amount of 
communication and related workload and provides 
a consistent situational awareness across the BDR 
organization. 
In order to make the right decisions, the technical 
management in the Ships Control Centre (the 
NBCD officer, the mechanical officer and the 
electrical officer) requires a good overall awareness 
of the situation. On today’s ships, these officers rely 
for 80% of their information on communication 
even though the information on the status of all 
technical systems is available in the IPMS. The 
technical management in the SCC requires a 
system that provides a clear, commonly accessible, 
overall picture of the technical systems and their 
status in relation to the Command Aim.
The operators in the Ships Control Centre 
experience a high workload. This is partly caused by 
the time required for repetitive operator sequences 
and high communication and cognitive loads. 
A system is required that automates repetitive 
sequences and assists the operator in analyzing 
the effect of alarms, can reduce the workload and 
increase the effectiveness of the operator.
Interactive Electronic Incident Board
One of the first objectives of the FFDC Workgroup 
was to re-design the electronic plotting aids. This 
resulted in an Interactive Electronic Incident 
Board that combines a conventional plotter 
screen with a distributed FFDC automation 
and Multi-Touch displays. This feature also 
allows presentation of other applications, such 
as CCTV, which provides immediate access to 
visual information about the scene of the incident 
directly on the IEIB displays.
This FFDC application ensures that entered 
information is distributed to all electronic incident 
boards and workstations across the ship, ensuring 
the available information is consistent across the 
ship. This also includes interfacing with ships’ 
automation system with information of fire 
detectors, doors, hatches, etc.
This FFDC application ensures that entered 
information is distributed to all electronic incident 
Design of Task Oriented Based 
FFDC Applications
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boards and workstations across the ship, ensuring 
the available information is consistent across the 
ship. Th is also includes interfacing with ships’ 
automation system with information of fi re 
detectors, doors, hatches, etc.
From  every  FFDC  position  it  is  possible  to  plot 
symbols  like  fi re,  boundary  cooling  and  smoke 
boundaries, either through mouse and keyboard, 
or via multi-touch displays. Every type of symbol 
has its own specifi c properties and stages. Th e 
plot symbols are electronic version of the symbols 
defi ned in the Royal Netherlands Navy standard 
KN 15750. Th is makes it easy for personnel on 
board to switch from the conventional incident 
board (where the plotter draws the symbols by 
hand) to the FFDC HMI.
Selecting a plot symbol from the library and 
dragging it into a compartment is a user-friendly 
approach for placing a symbol on a desired spot. 
Subsequently, the state and time of the symbol 
becomes automatically available on all FFDC 
stations. In the FFDC HMI all kinds of features 
have been implemented to meet requirements for 
optimal control of the application, particularly 
under stress conditions. In the FFDC overview 
screen it is possible to present all kinds of important 
information for BDR. Th e FFDC HMI stores 
this information in layers. It is important that 
at any given time only the relevant and required 
information is presented; other information layers 
can be hidden. 
Examples of information layers are:
1. A and B-type fi re wall layer; 
2. Citadel information layer; 
Fig. 7. JSS Interactive Electronic Incident Board.
Fig. 8. Interactive Electronic Display Mimic.
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3. Safety and fire equipment layer; 
4. Hazardous equipment layer. 
A free scribble option of the FFDC HMI gives 
the operator the possibility to draw (and share) 
lines (e.g. attack and evaluation routes) and to 
place texts in the Deck view window of the FFDC 
plotter screen. 
The IEIB was specifically designed and tested to 
increase situational awareness while at the same 
time reduce communication.
Wireless Hand-Held Devices
A second application that resulted from the 
working group are the Hand Held devices, or 
PDA’s that are deployed on the Holland Class 
PV. Engineers can use PDA’s to display the status 
of the systems when operating the equipment, 
during planned maintenance and in case of 
incidents. As a result, the Ship’s Control Center 
can be unmanned, while duty personnel are 
‘online’ and have access to the designated systems 
anywhere on the vessel.
For Battle Damage Repair the integration of 
wireless connected handheld devices can be 
used to optimize local tasks/actions and increase 
situational awareness. For example, the handhelds 
allows team leaders to directly enter  information 
from  the  scene  of  the  incident  into  the  FFDC 
system, while the FFDC system  ensures  that 
information  is  shared  almost  instantaneously 
and can make plotters redundant.
Battle Damage Repair Procedure 
Application
A system to program and execute BDR procedures 
is under development that can automate repetitive 
sequences and assist the operator in analyzing 
the effect of alarms, thus reducing workload and 
increasing the effectiveness of the operator.
In general, it is not too difficult to automate 
functions and sequences, a feature which is already 
incorporated in Imtech Platform Management 
System (IPMS). 
However, as mentioned in chapter 2, 
automaticity also has drawbacks and BDR 
automated sequences have to be specified way 
in advance when the software is configured or 
hard coded. This is particularly the case for 
sequences that depend on the various conditions 
or sensor information. This causes another 
serious drawback as the definition of procedures 
depends heavily on experience which is obtained 
over the life cycle of a ship. 
This insight initiated the requirement of the 
Royal Netherlands Navy for an Advice Builder, 
an application that enables designers as well as 
operators to assemble procedures during the 
engineering phase and during the time that the 
ship is in service. The Imtech IPMS used on 
modern ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy 
already includes ‘Apps’ that allow external systems 
to give commands to virtually any ship system 
that is monitored and controlled by the IPMS. 
That enabled the workgroup to acquire a better 
understanding of the real requirements. This 
resulted in an application comprising four parts: 
1. a Procedure Module in the IPMS filled with 
the available procedures; 
2. a dedicated HMI interface to the operator; 
3. ‘App’ within the IPMS responsible for 
executing the triggers and steps;  
4. an Advice Builder to be used for configuration 
of the procedures. 
Fig. 9. 
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The Procedure Module resembles a database 
filled with procedures that have been designed, 
and subsequently tested, on shore-based facilities. 
The ‘App’ within the IPMS will start a specific 
Procedure once the pre-defined condition of that 
Procedure is met. There are 3 types of procedures 
1. Alarm procedures are procedures initiated by 
the activation of an alarm. These procedures 
are  often used to handle problems of platform 
systems;
2. Engine Room Emergency Measures are 
procedures relevant to the safe navigation of 
the ship. These can be initiated by an alarm or 
from a comparison of in the IPMS available 
plaform signals; 
3. Killcards are procedures which can be 
selected by an operator via a drop-down list 
box in the IPMS mimic. The Killcards are 
sorted by section, deck, position and type of 
killcard (Fire, Energy, Flooding).
 
Procedures are presented in a dedicated IPMS 
Procedure Mimic. In mode Auto, the procedure 
‘App’ will carry out the procedural steps. In  modes 
Semi-Auto  and  Manual,  the  procedure  App 
will  wait  upon  operator acceptance. Each step 
implies executing a command and waiting upon 
start conditions for the next step. Below Fig. 10 
shows the HMI of the IPMS Procedure Module. 
The 10 buttons on the left side of the procedure 
mimic depict the active procedures and the type of 
the procedures. The color of the buttons indicates 
the status of the procedures: Green for active and 
Red for a failure of a procedure.
Stability Management System (currently 
under development)
The stability management system shows the ship 
stability in the event of an incident. Normally 
this will only be the tank levels for they have a 
Fig. 11. Stability Status Application
Fig. 10. BDR Procedure mimic.
Actual
Trend
Worst Case
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major impact on the ships stability. But there are 
more events that can cause ship instability on 
board, of any kind of vessel. One of this causes 
are leakages, whether they are internal leakages 
(oil leakage, defective pipes, water used for fire 
extinguishing, etc) or external leakages (collision 
or impact damage) they can play a crucial part in 
maintaining the ships stability.
Within the Interactive Electronic Incident Board 
it is possible to set leakage plot symbols on the 
general arrangement containing information about 
the kind of leakage (oil, water, etc.) and a list of all 
the known water levels related with the leakage. 
Together with the water levels, this information 
will be automatically processed by a ships stability 
application which calculates the impact on the 
ships stability. As a result, the IEIB will show the 
user three stability states each with three severity 
indicators:
•	 Green - No danger for ships stability, no 
further action needed.
•	 Orange - Possible danger for ships stability, 
further action desired.
•	 Red  - Ship stability is in grave danger, instant 
action needed.
The Stability Management System gives the crew 
a comprehensive status of the current stability and 
where it might lead to if no counter actions will 
be made. And because it is all integrated, the crew 
will only have to update the IEIB which saves time 
feeding the system with stability information.
Operational Maintenance Support Model
As a baseline for future integration of multiple 
technical disciplines and maintenance tasks, 
the RLNL developed an enhanced Battle 
Damage Repair Activity Cycle or ‘Operational 
Maintenance Support Model’, including 
following discrete elements and tasks:
1. State: Operational State of the System and 
it’s components as indicated through the 
automation system or manually identified and 
documented.
2. Effect: Availability of the Function translated 
to other Systems and Capabilities.
3. Cause: Troubleshooting by means of 
Diagnostics (BITE) or through the experience 
and training of the crew.
4. Execute: Measures (Procedures) to correct 
malfunctioning equipment
5. Manage: Reduce the impact of malfunctioning 
and maintain the desired Capabilities.
6. Advice: Interaction between operational 
objectives and Capabilities of the vessel.
As the State of discrete elements like technical 
systems and components form the foundation 
for this model, the information available within 
the automation systems (I/O, BITE messages) are 
paramount.
To predict the effect of one discrete element, 
operational requirements and platform capabilities 
must be decomposed or projected on the 
configuration of all participants that contribute to 
a particular function. This so called ‘Functional 
Chain Analysis’, has already been utilized in the 
diagnostic features of RNLN Combat Management 
Systems, however they exclude platform systems.
For future Frigate projects of the RNLN, this 
method will be applied to support maintenance 
and crew reductions by means of automation.
Future Developments
Fig. 12. 
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Platform/Weapon Integration
Th e CMS support systems typically consist of 
three important functions.
1. Power Generation
2. Electrical Distribution
3. Heating, Ventilation & Cooling (chilled 
water)
For the Holland Class PV, the functional 
dependency between platform and CMS was not 
integrated in the automation systems. However, 
to achieve the Operational Requirements with 
a reduced complement, the RNLN decided 
to develop a Command Bridge comprising of 
Navigation Bridge, CIC and SCC. Battle Damage 
Repair can also be directed from the Engineering 
Offi  ce, depending on the operational scenario.
However, as mentioned earlier, for the future 
Frigate project, platform and CMS (automation) 
systems will be integrated using a generic data-bus 
system and diagnostic data elements including 
applications to process this information according 
the Operational Maintenance Support Model.
Fig. 13. Command Bridge.
Fig. 14. Generic Data Element.
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Distributed Intelligent Networked Control 
Systems
On  board  Royal  Netherlands  Navy  ships 
many  complex  platform  support  systems  exist 
such  as  cooling  systems, electrical systems, and 
fire extinguishing systems. The complexity of 
these systems is hard to manage for the personnel, 
especially in case of emergency when reaction 
times have to be short. The problem is made worse 
by the decreasing availability of highly qualified 
personnel over the last decade.  Both problems are 
reason for the Defence Materiel 
Organization (DMO) to create control systems 
that can autonomously restore the functionality 
of the platform support systems in case of (battle) 
damage, taking into account the ever changing 
and uncertain status of these platform support 
systems. 
The approach is to create intelligent components 
such as chillers, pumps, valves, sensors, and end 
users, and to give these intelligent components 
human-like reasoning. In real life, the human 
operator will always follow three steps when 
dealing with a damaged system, irrespective of 
the physical nature of that system: (1) isolating 
the damaged part from the rest of the system to 
prevent further damage; (2) finding new supply 
paths to the end users of the system so as to restore 
the system’s functionality;  and (3) supplying  the 
end  users  with  the  correct  amount  of  what 
they  need  (e.g., cooling,  electricity). In a research 
project performed by TNO, intelligent agents 
were created with three levels  of intelligence that 
contain these steps. These agents communicate 
with each other through a shared network. If part 
of the control system is lost, the remaining agents 
are still able to communicate with each other and 
control the part they have access to.
The DINCS engine or algorithm is based on a 
‘Graph’ representation, similar to contemporary 
navigation systems, which is decomposed in 
following elements/definitions:
•	 Platform system comprises of:
‒ Platform Devices (Pumps, Valves, 
Generators)
‒ Connections (pipes, cables, ducts)
•	  Mathematically represented as Graph by:
‒ Edges
‒ Nodes
•	  Properties of Edges / Nodes: 
‒ One-direction
‒ Cost (usage of resources, wear and tear 
(running hours))
‒ Capacity
‒ Priority
•	  Mathematics provided algorithms for:
‒ Shortest path
‒ Maximum flow
‒ Minimum cost
The DINCS prototype is currently implemented 
for the fire mains system of RNLN LPD 
Rotterdam, as part of an upgrade of the (Imtech) 
automation system.
Operator Load analysis are paramount in the 
development of future Automation Systems, in 
particular Damage Surveillance And Control 
systems. The development of applications must 
incorporate operational management as well as 
functional interrelationships between platform 
systems. As a result application of technological 
advances can only be realized in close cooperation 
with intended users and designers. For the Patrol 
Vessel of the RNLN this was realized by a 
Fig. 15. DINCS mathematical model.
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joint project team, task- and workload analyisis 
supported by a rapid prototyping development 
model.
This working method not only proved very 
effective but also unveiled substantial potential 
for future developments, which RNLN will 
implement successively.
This paper contains a logical compilation of earlier 
studies performed by Imtech and personnel of the 
Netherlands’ Defense Material Organization. 
Although major authors have been listed, the 
proceedings described in this document, surely 
could not have been established without the 
commitment of the FFDC workgroup members, 
the project teams and many other people who 
have contributed to the fundamental research.
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